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In this paper, we study the existence of weighted Nash-equilibria and Pareto
equilibria for non-compact multiobjective games with multicriteria as applications
of the Ky Fan minimax principle in 1972. As results, several existence theorems for
non-compact weighted Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibria are established. These
include the corresponding results in recent literature as special cases. Q 1996
Academic Press, Inc.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the study of the existence of Pareto equilibria in game theory
with vector payoffs has been attracted by many authors, for example, see
w x w x w xBergstresser and Yu 3 , Borm et al. 4 , Ghose and Prasad 7 , Szi-
w x w x w x w x w xdarovszky et al. 9 , Tanaka 10 , Wang 12 , Yu 13 , Yu and Yuan 14 ,
w xZeleny 16 , and references therein. The motivation for the study of
w xmulticriteria models can be found in Bergstresser and Yu 3 , Szidarovszky
w x w xet al. 9 , and Zeleny 16 . The existence of Pareto equilibria is one of the
fundamental problems in game theory. It is our purpose in this paper to
present some existence results of Pareto equilibria as applications of the
Ky Fan minimax inequality. Our results in this paper could be regarded as
a unified improvement of corresponding existence results of Pareto equi-
libria given in the literature.
Now we recall and introduce some notations and definitions. In this
paper, we shall consider a finite-players game with multicriteria in its
 .  i.strategic form also called a normal from G [ X , F , where N [i ig N
*The corresponding author. E-mail address: xzy@axiom.maths.uq.oz.au.
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 4 k i1, 2, . . . , n . For each player i g N, X is the set of strategies in R andi
each F i is a mapping from X [ P X into R k i, which is called theig N i
 .payoff function or say, multicriteria of the i's player, here k is a positivei
 1 2 n.integer. If a strategy x [ x , x , . . . , x g X is played, each player i is
i  i . i . i  ..trying to minimize herrhis payoff function F [ f x , f x , . . . , f x ,1 2 k i
which consists of non-commensurable outcomes. Each player i has a
preference # over the outcome space R k i. For each player i g N, itsi
preference # is given asi
z1 # z 2 if and only if z1 G z 2i j j
1  1 1 1 . 2for each j s 1, 2, . . . , k , where z [ z , z , . . . , z and z si 1 2 k i
 2 2 2 . k iz , z , . . . , z are any element in R . The players' preference relations1 2 k i
induce the preference on X, defined for each player i, and chooses
 1 n.  1 n.x s x , . . . , x and y s y , . . . , y g X by
x # y whenever F i x # F i y . .  .i i
Also we assume that the model of a game is this paper is a noncooperative
game, i.e., there is no communication between players, so players act as
free agents; each player is trying to minimize herrhis own payoff according
to herrhis preferences.
 .For the games with vector payoff functions or say, multicriteria , it is
well known that in general there does not exist a strategy x g X toÃ
 . iminimize or equivalently, maximize all f 's for each player; for example,j
w xsee the reference of Yu 13 . Hence we need to recall some solution
concepts for multicriteria games.
Throughout this paper, for each given m g N, we shall denote by R mq
the nonnegative orthant of R m, i.e.,
R m [ u [ u1 , . . . , um g R m such that u j G 0 for j [ 1, . . . , m , 4 .q
so that the nonnegative orthant R m of R m has a non-empty interior withq
the topology induced in terms of convergence of vectors with respect to the
Euclidean metric. That is,
int R m [ u [ u1 , . . . , um g R m : u j ) 0 for all j s 1, . . . , m . 4 .q
Ãi 1 n .For each i g N, denote X [ P X . If x s x , . . . , x g X, wejg N _i4 jÃ Ãi 1 iy1 iq1 n i i .shall write x s x , . . . , x , x , ??? x g X . If x g X and x g X ,Ã Ãi i iÃi i 1 n i i .  .we shall use x , x to denote y s y , . . . , y g X such that y s x and
Ã Ãi i 1 n .y s x . Let x [ x , . . . , x g X. Now we have the following definition.Ã Ã Ã
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DEFINITION 1. A strategy x i g X of player i is said to be a ParetoÃ i
 .efficient strategy resp. a weak Pareto efficient strategy with respect to x ifÃ
there is no strategy x i g X such thati
Ã Ãi i i i k i i i i ki i 4F x y F x , x g R _ 0 resp, F x y F x , x g int R . .  .  .  .Ã Ã Ã Ã .q q
DEFINITION 2. A strategy x g X is said to be a Pareto equilibrium resp.Ã
.  i.a weak Pareto equilibrium of a game G [ X , F if, for each playeri ig N
i i, x g X is a Pareto efficient strategy with respect to x resp. a weakÃ Ãi
.Pareto efficient strategy with respect to x .Ã
From the above definition, it is clear that each Pareto equilibrium is a
weak Pareto equilibrium, but the converse is not always true. We also need
w xthe following definition which was first given by Wang in 12 .
DEFINITION 3. A strategy x g X is said to be a weighted Nash-equi-Ã
 1 n.librium with respect to the weighted vector W [ W , . . . , W of a game
 i.G s X , F if for each player i g N, we have thati ig N
 . i k i  41 W g R _ 0 ; andq
Ãi i i i i i i .  .   ..2 W ? F x F W ? F x , x for each x g X , where ? denotesÃ Ã i
the inner product.
Remark 1. In Particular, when W i g T k i for all i g N, the strategyq
x g X is said to be a normalized weighted Nash-equilibrium with respect toÃ
W, where T k i is a simplex of R k i, i.e.,q
ki
k 1 k k ji i iT [ u [ u , . . . , u g R : such that u s 1 . . q q 5
js1
i k i  4Let W g R _ 0 be fixed for each i g N. From the definition above, itq
is not difficult to verify that a strategy x g X is a weighted Nash-equi-Ã
 1 n.librium with respect to the weighted vector W s W , . . . , W of a game
i Ã i .X , F is and only if for each i g N, X is an optimal solution of thei ig N
optimization problem:
Ãk i i i iMin W ? F x , x . P i , W .  .Ã  .
ix gXi
2. THE EXISTENCE OF WEIGHT NASH-EQUILIBRIA
In order to study the existence of Pareto equilibria as applications of Ky
w xFan minimax inequality in 6 , we first need the following non-compact
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version of the Ky Fan minimax inequality which is due to Ding and Tan
w x5, p. 235 and we state it as:
 .THEOREM A Ky Fan Mimimax Principle . Let X be a non-empty con¨ex
set in a Hausdorff topological ¨ector space and f a real-¨ alued function defined
on X = X. Suppose there exist a non-empty compact con¨ex subset X of X0
and a non-empty compact subset K of X such that
 .  .1 for each fixed x g X, f x, y is a compactly lower semicontinuous
function of y on X ;
 .  .  .  .2 for each A g F X and y g co A , we ha¨e min f x, y F 0x g A
  .in particular, condition 2 is satisfied if we assume that for each fixed y g X,
 .  .f x, y is a quasi-conca¨ e function of x on X and f x, x F 0 for each
.  .x g X where f x denotes the family of all non-empty finite subsets of X ; and
 .   4.3 for each y g X _ K, there exists x g co X j y such that0
 .f x, y ) 0.
Then there exists y g K such that0
sup f x , y F sup f x , x . .  .0
xgX xgX
Remark 2. Indeed, the famous Ky Fan minimax inequality above has
been generalized in many ways. For more details, interested readers can
find other generalizations of Ky Fan minimax inequalities and their
w x w xapplications in Tarafdar 11 , Yuan 15 , and many other references therein.
As an application of Theorem A, we have the following:
 i.THEOREM 1. Let G s X , F be a gi¨ en multiobjecti¨ e game, wherei ig N
i  i i .F s f , . . . , f for i g N. For each i g N, suppose X is a non-empty1 k ii
con¨ex subset of a Hausdorff topological ¨ector space E . Suppose X 0 and Ki i i
are a non-empty compact and con¨ex subset of X and a non-empty compacti
 .not necessarily con¨ex subset of X , respecti¨ ely, for each i g I. If there is ai
 1 n. i k i  4weighted ¨ector W s W , . . . , W with W g R _ 0 such that the follow-q
ing are satisfied:
Ãi i i i .  .1 for each fixed y g X, the mapping x ¬  W ? F x , y isig N
upper semicontinuous on X ;
Ãi i i i .  .  .2 the mapping x, y ¬  W ? F x , y is jointly lower semi-ig N
continuous on X = X ;
Ãi i i i .  .3 for each fixed x g X, the mapping y ¬  W ? F x , y isig N
quasi-con¨ ex; and
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 .   4.4 for each x g X _ K, there exists y g co X j x such that0
n n
Ã Ãi i i i i i i iW ? F x , x ) W ? F x , y , .  . 
is1 is1
where X [  n X 0 and K [  n K ,0 is1 i is1 i
then G has at least one weighted Nash-equilibria.
Proof. Define a mapping f : X = X ª R by
n
Ã Ãi i i i i i if x , y [ W ? F x , x y F x , y .  .  . .
is1
 .for each x, y g X = X. Then we have that:
 .  .1 for each fixed y g X, x ¬ f x, y is lower semicontinuous;
 .  .2 for each fixed x g X, the mapping y ¬ f x, y is quasi-concave;
 .  .3 f x, x F 0 for all x g X ; and
 .   4.4 for each x g X _ K, there exists y g co X j x such that0
 .f x, y ) 0.
By the Ky Fan minimax inequality above, i.e., Theorem A, there exists
x g K such that for each y g X,Ã
n
Ã Ãi i i i i i if x , y s W ? F x , x y F x , y F 0. .  .Ã Ã Ã Ã .  .
is1
Ã Ãi i i i i .   .Let y s x , y g X for i s 1, 2, . . . , n, then we have W ? F x , x yÃ Ã Ãi
Ãi i ..F x , y F 0, which implies thatÃ i
Ã Ãi i i i i i i iW ? F x , x s min W ? F x , u . . .Ã Ã Ã
iu gXi
Thus x is a weighted Nash-equilibrium point of the game G with respectÃ
to the weighted vector W.
Remark 3. Theorem 1 does not only improve corresponding existence
results of weighted Nash-equilibria for multiobjective games with multicri-
w xteria given by Wang 12, Theorem 3.1 , but it also extends Theorem 1.11 of
w x w xSzidarovszky et al. in 9 and Theorem 1 of Borm et al. in 4 to Hausdorff
topological vector spaces under weaker continuous hypotheses.
3. THE EXISTENCE OF PARETO EQUILIBRIA
In this section, as applications of weighted Nash-equilibria, we shall
derive some existence of Pareto equilibrium for multiobjective games. In
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order to do so, we first need the following lemma which tells us that the
existence problem for Pareto equilibria can be reduced to the existence of
the weighted Nash-equilibria under certain circumstance.
LEMMA 1. Each normalized weighted Nash-equilibrium x g X with aÃ
 1 n. k1 k n   1 n.weight W s W , . . . , W g T = ??? = T resp., W s W , . . . , W gq q
k1 k n. intT = ??? = intT is a weak Pareto equilibrium resp., a Pareto equilib-q q
.  i.rium of the game X , F .i ig N
w xProof. It is Lemma 2.1 of Wang 12, pp. 376]377 .
Remark 4. We should note that the conclusion of above Lemma 1 still
 1 n.holds if x is a weighted Nash-equilibrium with a weight W s W , . . . , WÃ
i k i  i k i.satisfying that W g R resp., W g int R for each i g N. Secondly,q q
we note that a Pareto equilibria is not necessarily a weighted Nash-
equilibrium.
Now by combining Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, we have the following
existence of Pareto equilibria for multiobjective games in Hausdorff topo-
logical vector spaces.
 i.THEOREM 2. Let G s X , F be a multiobjecti¨ e game, wherei ig N
i  i i .F s f , . . . , f for i g N. For each i g N, suppose X is a non-empty1 k ii
compact and con¨ex subset of a Hausdorff topological ¨ector space E .i
Suppose that for each i g N, X 0 and K are a non-empty compact andi i
 .con¨ex subset of X and a non-empty compact not necessarily con¨ex subseti
 1 n.of X , respecti¨ ely. If there is a weighted ¨ector W s W , . . . , W withi
i k i  4W g R _ 0 such that the following are satisfied:q
Ãi i i i .  .1 for each fixed y g X, the mapping x ¬  W ? F x , y isig N
upper semicontinuous on X ;
Ãi i i i .  .  .2 the mapping x, y ¬  W ? F x , y is jointly lower semi-ig N
continuous on X = X ;
Ãi i i i .  .3 for each fixed x g X, the mapping y ¬  W ? F x , y isig N
quasi-con¨ ex; and
 .   4.4 for each x g X _ K, there exists y g co X j x such that0
n n
Ã Ãk i i i i i i iW ? F x , x ) W ? F x , y , .  . 
is1 is1
where X [  n X 0 and K [  n K ,0 is1 i is1 i
Then G has at least one weak Pareto equilibrium in K. In addition, if
W i g int T k i for each i s 1, . . . , n, then G has at least one Pareto equilib-q
rium.
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Proof. By Theorem 1, G has at least one weighted Nash-equilibrium xÃ
with respect to the weighted vector W. Now Lemma 1 shows that x is alsoÃ
a weak Pareto equilibrium of G, and thus the conclusion follows.
As an immediate consequence of Theorem 2, we have the following
 i.THEOREM 3. Let G s X , F be a multiobjecti¨ e game, wherei ig N
i  i i .F s f , . . . , f for i g N. For each i g N, suppose X is a non-empty1 k ii
con¨ex subset of a Hausdorff topological ¨ector space E , and X 0 and K arei i i
a non-empty compact and con¨ex subset of X and a non-empty compact noti
.necessarily con¨ex subset of X , respecti¨ ely. Moreo¨er we assume that thei
following conditions are satisfied for j s 1, . . . , k :i
 . i1 the f is jointly lower semicontinuous on X ;j
Ãi i i i .  .2 for each fixed y g X , the function f x , y is upper semicontinu-i j
Ãious on X ;
Ã Ã Ãi i i i .  .3 for each fixed x g X , the function f x , ? is con¨ex on X ; andj i
 .   4.4 for each x g X _ K, there exists y g co X j x such that for all0Ã Ãi i i i i i n 0 .  .i s 1, . . . , n, we ha¨e f x , x ) f x , y where X [  X and K [j j 0 is1 i
 n K .is1 i
Then the multiobjecti¨ e game G has at least one Pareto equilibrium in K.
 1 n. iProof. Take any fixed weighted vector W s W , . . . , W , where W g
k i  .  .int T for each i s 1, . . . , n. From conditions 1 ] 4 , if follows that allq
hypotheses of Theorem 2 are satisfied. Thus G has at least one weighted
Nash-equilibrium x with respect to the weighted vector W. As W i g int T k iÃ q
for each i g N, x must be a Pareto equilibrium point of G and weÃ
complete the proof.
Before we close this section, we state the following result which is a
compact version of Theorem 3.
 i.COROLLARY 4. Let G s X , F be a multiobjecti¨ e game. For eachi ig N
i g N, suppose X is a non-empty compact and con¨ex subset of a Hausdorffi
topological ¨ector space E and the following conditions are satisfied fori
j s 1, . . . , k :i
 . i1 the f is jointly lower semicontinuous on X ;j
Ãi i i i .  .2 for each fixed y g X , the function f x , y is upper semicontinu-i j
Ãious on X ; and
Ã Ã Ãi i i i .  .3 for each fixed x g X , the function f x , ? is con¨ex on X .j i
Then the multiobjecti¨ e game G has at least one Pareto equilibrium.
Remark 5. In this paper, we studied the existence of weighted Nash-
equilibria and Pareto equilibria as applications of some nonlinear analysis
principle, i.e., mainly the Ky Fan minimax principle which was established
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by Fan himself in 1972. As the Ky Fan minimax inequality plays a very
important role in the study of applied nonlinear analysis e.g., see Aubin
w x w x w x w x1 , Aubin and Ekeland 2 , Lin and Simons 8 , Yu and Yuan 14 , Yuan
w x .15 , and others , hopefully, the Ky Fan minimax inequality method would
also play another important role in the study of optimization, in particular
for the investigation of the existence for Pareto equilibria in the vector-val-
ued optimization problems and multiobjective games; in this way, the
w xpioneer work has been carried out by Yu and Yuan in 14 .
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